The Fog of Ideology

After reading Known and Unknown - Donald Rumsfeld's tome (815 pages) - I put the book back in the shelf, flummoxed that smart people can be so dumb. He would have been better to have just called it "Known" because he never admits to self-doubt through the entire book. It was a frustrating read.It drew my memory back to the special debate on Egypt we had in Parliament last week. Key speeches by members of all parties were made on how to move forward in a session that ran from 6:30 until midnight. Some of the exchanges were fascinating, some frustrating, but each had one thing in common: acknowledged ignorance. Here were smart people like Bob Rae, Paul Dewar and Lawrence Cannon offering reasoned arguments while confessing confusion about rapid developments in that great Middle-Eastern nation. It was a pleasure to be part of, especially so up close and personal.In his book, the former American Defense Secretary admits to no such vagueness. In a phrase: he was never wrong. He admits to leading during perilous times, but always the failure of policies and actions fell to someone else. He lays the bulk of blame for the debacle that became Iraq on George H. W. Bush. Why? Because he was too principled. Having promised the UN and his allies that he would not defy international protocol and invade Iraq (his mandate was to free Kuwait), the former president stuck to those terms. Rumsfeld naturally substituted "principled" with "reckless".Virtually everyone who crossed Rumsfeld's path gets sideswiped in his book. His mockery of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's affirmation that "human rights trump security" forms a particularly low point in his narrative.Contrast Rumsfeld's outlook with that of another former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and you get a clear departure in outlook. Part of the "Best and Brightest" in numerous administrations, starting with John Kennedy's, McNamara, like Rumsfeld, came from a working class family. Yet his particular strategic brilliance propelled him to the office of president for the Ford Motor Corporation, from where he was drafted into public service. One of the key architects of America's ultimately futile involvement in Vietnam, McNamara came to question his own judgement years later. In the Academy Award winning documentary The Fog of War, he uses his own words to describe his doubts about his earlier performances. These are the reflections of a seasoned human observer, testifying near the end of his life, and his moments of clarity and humility represent everything that Rumsfeld couldn't come close to matching. While the main architect of George W. Bush's "Shock and Awe" campaign blames everybody else, listen to McNamara's reflections:

• we misjudged the geopolitical intentions of our adversary
• we viewed the people and leaders of Vietnam only through the filter of our own experience, little understanding the region
• we underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people we didn't understand
• our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of history
• we did not recognize that neither our people or our leaders are omniscient
• we failed to recognize that in international affairs there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions

These are remarkable utterances, made all the more poignant by McNamara's placing himself at the centre of fault. While obvious failure on such a grand scale made him more humble and therefore more sympathetic as a character, Rumsfeld's inability to see his own role in the declining process of America's greatness smacks of an arrogance which his country can little afford, thereby alienating him from the reader.Foreign diplomacy and international affairs are far too complex for the arrogant. Historic sympathies and lessons must be gathered and mastered if a nation is to chart its course and seek a positive global influence. The Harper government's blaming of other forces (Michael Ignatieff, unprincipled voters, its relentless pro-Israel policies) for its lack of competence in capturing a Security Council seat smacks more of Rumsfeld than of the seasoned judgments of Robert McNamara.The current developments in Egypt remind us that the world is far too complex for simplistic reasoning. Canada's failure to incorporate a more experienced understanding of internationalism in favour of rigid ideology has diminished our stature and undermined this country's track record of possessing and acting upon some of the most seasoned diplomatic lessons of the modern age. Forget Rumsfeld's book, unless you crave disillusionment. Opt instead for The Fog of War or any good biography of Lester Pearson's international efforts.